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The World Economy 
continuing evidence of a build up of inflationary 
pressure throughout the OECD. Annual inflation in 
the OECD as a whole rose to 7.3% in September, and 
5.7% for the G7 countries, compared with 6.6% and 
5.2% respectively in the year to June. Most of 
the individual countries within the G7 also 
experienced a rise in the annual rate of inflation 
of around 0.5 percentage points, with the 
exception of Italy where the rate of inflation 
remained virtually unchanged. Consumer price 
inflation rates for the G7 countries were as 
follows: Canada 4.8%; United States 6.3%; Japan 
3.5%; France 3.9%; Germany 3.3%; Italy 6.2%; 
United Kingdom 10.9%. 
MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 
GDP data on some of the G7 countries for the third 
quarter of 1990 is not yet available, and so 
overall comparisons with the last quarter are not 
possible. In those countries for which data is 
available the general trend is a fairly sharp 
decline in growth in the third quarter. 
Individual growth rates are as follows (year to 
September); Canada 0.5%; United States 1.1%; Japan 
5.4%; France 2.8%; UK 0.6%. 
Despite some evidence of a decline in September, 
year-on-year growth in industrial production 
continued to be healthy in the third quarter of 
1990. In the year to September both the G7 
countries and the OECD as a whole experienced 2.6% 
growth in industrial production. As in previous 
quarters, the German and Japanese economies 
continued to provide the bulk of the growth, with 
increases in industrial production of 6.0% and 
7.7% respectively for the year to September 
(October for Japan). While less spectacular, 
France (2.4%) and the United States (1.8%) also 
showed reasonably healthy growth, while the UK 
went into sharp decline, with annual growth of -
2.3% for the year to September. Growth rates of 
industrial production for the remaining G7 
countries were Italy, 0.6% and Canada, -4.2%. 
In the three months to September there was 
Indices of industrial production 
Seasonally adjusted (1985-188) 
140 
115 
90 
65 
—i T r — — r 1 — 
1981 1983 198S 1987 1989 1991 
In the OECD as a whole the rate of unemployment 
has been virtually unchanged throughout 1990. In 
October the G7 average was 5.6% with the OECD as a 
whole at 6.1%, both fractionally up on the 
respective rates for July. This was also the 
picture for individual countries within the G7, 
except for Germany where a marginal fall occurred. 
Individual countries' rates of unemployment in 
October were as follows: Canada 8.7%; United 
States 5.6%; Japan 2.2%; France 8.9%; Germany 
4.9%; Italy 9.9% (July); UK 6.5%. 
United States 
The US authorities have finally decided that 
recession is more of a threat than inflation in 
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the short run, and have now ordered their domestic 
economic policy with this in mind. The Bush 
administration now takes the view that the US 
economy is in recession - but only just, and with 
high hopes of a robust recovery in the latter part 
of 1991 and into 1992. The official forecast is 
for two quarters of declining GDP; the final 
quarter of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991. 
But this is expected to be followed by a rapid 
turnaround in the second half of this year leading 
to GDP growth for 1991 of 0.9%. 
This seems to be rather optimistic, and recently 
the administration has shown a tendency to be 
overly optimistic on growth and to underestimate 
the impact of the budget deficit. In the final 
quarter of 1990 GNP fell at an annualised rate of 
2.1%, which was no worse than might have been 
expected. Other economic indicators, however, 
remain stubbornly bleak, most notably retail 
sales. In nominal terms, retail sales were 
provisionally estimated to have fallen by 0.4% in 
December, which was later heavily revised to show 
a nominal fall of 1.5% for the month. This was 
followed by a further fall of 0.9% (provisional) 
for January, leading to a 1.4% fall for the year 
to January. In addition, the broad money 
aggregate M3 fell between September and December 
at an annual rate of 1%, which was part of the 
reason for the half of one percentage point fall 
in interest rates which occurred in early 
February. 
In fairness, there are some straws in the wind 
indicating a relatively short-lived recession. 
Nominal personal income and expenditure rose by 
0.7% in December, the second successive month of 
increase. and the composite index of leading 
indicators rose by 0.1% in December after fairly 
heavy falls in the previous four months. Together 
with rising inflation (6.1% in 1990 compared with 
4.6% in 1989), these sort of indicators suggest 
that the Federal reserve will continue to be 
cautious on monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, the United States will do well to 
achieve positive GDP growth in 1991, and it is 
still not clear that the budget deficit problem 
has been fully grasped. Even without the need to 
finance the war in the Gulf, official estimates of 
the deficit have now risen to $318 billion for 
1991 and $281 billion for 1992, and, as outlined 
in the last Commentary, plans to eliminate the 
budget deficit in four years depend on rapid and 
sustainable growth in 1992 and beyond. As 
indicated elsewhere in this Commentary, the costs 
of Desert Shield and Desert Storm could add 
considerably to the United States' problems in 
deficit terms, but at least the threat of markedly 
higher oil prices has not materialised to threaten 
what growth might be achieved in the latter part 
of 1991. It remains the case, however, that 
neither the short-run growth projections nor the 
medium-run deficit elimination targets seem likely 
to be achieved. 
Japan 
Japan continues to be one of the two major growth 
economies of the G7 nations. In 1990 GNP growth 
of 6.3% was achieved, with modest (by UK 
standards) inflation of around 3%. Concerns that 
inflation might accelerate further led to a 
continual tightening of monetary policy during 
1990, and partly as a result of this the growth of 
Japanese GNP is forecast to fall to around 4% in 
1991. The slowdown in growth is expected to 
derive principally from decreased investment 
rather than from a fall off in consumer demand. 
Both housing and capital investment show signs of 
tapering off, the former because of the successive 
bouts of tightening of monetary policy and the 
latter because of high land prices which may now 
have peaked. Overall investment growth in 1991 is 
now forecast to be around 4.6% compared with 10.6% 
in 1990. 
Although 4% GNP growth may seem impressive, the 
prospect of slackening domestic demand coupled 
with relaxations in US and UK monetary policy has 
been enough to prompt rumours that there was a 
possibility of a reduction of Japanese interest 
rates. The Bank of Japan was quick to deny this 
possibility, although there does appear to be some 
satisfaction in official circles that the rapidly-
growing money supply has been brought under 
control. There was a sharp fall in the growth of 
the money supply in December; in the calendar year 
1990 there was growth of 8.6%, the lowest rate of 
growth achieved since 1987. Much of this was 
achieved by a cut-back in bank lending as a result 
of higher interest rates, and the authorities do 
not seem to be overly concerned about the prospect 
of a 'credit crunch' as outlined in the last 
Commentary. Nevertheless, with evidence of 
inflation still rising and a persistently tight 
labour market the Bank of Japan will be very 
cautious about relaxing its grip on interest 
rates. 
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One side effect of the rapidly growing economy has 
been a substantial fall in Japan's trade surplus 
with the rest of the world, an issue which has not 
received much prominence in recent months. In 
1990 the trade surplus fell by 18.5% to $52.4 
billion; during the year imports increased by 11% 
while exports rose by 4%. As domestic demand 
begins to falter there is every likelihood that 
the trade surplus will widen again, as fewer 
imports are sucked in. In addition, exports tend 
to be a key element of Japanese economic growth, a 
fact illustrated by the rapid increase in the 
trade surplus for January which resulted from 
particularly buoyant exports to South East Asia. 
Germany 
The West German economy has been on a cycle of 
accelerating growth since 1987, fuelled mainly by 
rapidly-growing investment and exports, and now 
appears to have peaked in 1990 when GNP growth 
exceeded 4%. The Bundesbank now forecasts GNP 
growth of 3.0% in 1991, somewhat above the 
consensus forecast of 2.5% by the main German 
economic institutes. The principal issues which 
are presently occupying the West German 
authorities are the fiscal and inflationary 
consequences of German unification and, to a much 
lesser extent, the Gulf war. 
As indicated in the previous Commentary, West 
Germany dramatically underestimated the costs of 
unification with the East. The economy of East 
Germany has collapsed in rather more spectacular 
fashion than might have been expected. According 
to recent forecasts, the expected performance of 
the East German economy in 1991 is as follows; GNP 
-16.5%; unemployment and short-term working 
reaching 42% of the workforce; industrial 
production -30%; exports -66%; and labour costs 
rising by 25%. Most of the costs of financing the 
collapse and reconstruction of the East will fall 
on the buoyant economy of West Germany. There is 
no doubt that the West can bear this burden, but 
at considerable cost to its budget deficit, which 
is now expected to rise to DM160 billion from the 
DM70 billion which was achieved in 1990. This 
does not, of course, include any contributions to 
the Gulf war. 
From a domestic point of view the main problem 
here is one of inflation, which began rising in 
1988 through rapid export-led growth and has been 
high by German standards (around 3%) since then. 
Between July and December 1990 the broad measure 
of money, M3, grew at an annualised rate of 7%, a 
situation which the authorities would not allow to 
persist for long. Monetary union and the 
(virtual) parity agreed between the D-Mark and the 
OstMark could have resulted in a substantial 
increase in inflationary pressure, but this has 
proved to be less than was expected. 
Nevertheless, the Bundesbank has acted decisively 
to prevent inflation from rising to uncomfortable 
levels by raising interest rates. The 0.5 
percentage point increase in early February was 
completely unexpected, and while rational from 
Germany's domestic perspective, did introduce 
problems for that country's ERM partners, 
particularly Britain. 
There are now indications that fiscal as well as 
monetary policy will be employed both to pay for 
German restructuring and to ensure that 
inflationary pressures do not build up further. 
In February a series of tax increases was 
announced which will yield DM50 billion (1.8% of 
GNP) in a full year, including higher petrol and 
income taxes from July. These will inevitably 
further slow the rate of growth of the German 
economy, but this is unlikely to depress GNP 
growth below around 3% per annum in the early 
1990s. There is, however, already evidence of a 
change in Germany's trade surplus with the rest of 
the world. Against estimated statistics for 1989, 
the trade surplus of the united Germany is 
estimated to have fallen by 20% in 1990, with the 
more accurate figures for West Germany alone 
indicating a 32% fall from the 1989 position. The 
West German trade surplus is now running at its 
lowest level since 1985. 
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PROGNOSIS 
The latter part of 1990 saw the end of an eight-
year boom in the economies of the industrialised 
countries which was brought about not by a further 
oil shock, but by steadily-tightening monetary 
policy stemming from rising inflationary pressure. 
With the major countries' economies now at 
different stages of their economic cycles this has 
resulted in a slowdown but not a slump, except for 
particular economies, most notably in the English-
speaking world. 
In the last three months the most interesting 
development has been what has not happened to oil 
prices. Several factors, including the inability 
of Iraq to affect Saudi supplies, has resulted in 
the oil price being closer to that suggested by 
the underlying determinants of supply and demand 
than that dictated by war panic; the world oil 
market is still in a state of basic oversupply. 
The lack of an oil shock and the steady growth of 
countries such as Germany and Japan has led to a 
modestly optimistic outlook for the industrialised 
world as a whole. While world trade is expected 
to slow from the rapid growth achieved in 1989 and 
before, it should still remain relatively healthy 
throughout 1991 (around 5%), unless there is a 
complete collapse of the reconvened GATT talks. 
As recently as last december the IMF was 
forecasting an average of 2.4% GNP growth in the 
G7 countries during 1991, with growth of around 3% 
during 1992-95. With the recession in the US and 
UK the 1991 forecast will not now be achieved, but 
the reasonably upbeat 1992-95 forecast is still 
possible if all goes well. Within Europe there 
are particular problems posed by German domestic 
policy for ERM members. Clearly Germany will 
continue to use a high D-Mark and tight monetary 
policy as a defence against inflation, which may 
mean ERM partners such as the UK deferring further 
interest rate cuts which may be warranted for 
reasons of domestic policy. But these problems 
are not insuperable, and for much of the 
industrialised world the outlook is by no means 
gloomy. 
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